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a b s t r a c t
In a pervasive computing environment, mobile users often roam into foreign domains.
Consequently, mutual authentication between the user and the service provider in
different domains becomes a critical issue. In this paper, a fast and secure inter-domain
authentication and key establishment scheme, namely IDAS, is proposed. IDAS adopts
Biometrics to guarantee the uniqueness and privacy of users and adopts signcryption
to generate a secure session key. IDAS can not only reduce the burden of certificates
management, but also protect the users and authentication servers against fraud.
Compared with some other authentication methods, our approach is superior with faster
key exchange and authentication, as well as more privacy. The correctness is verified with
the Syverson and Van Oorschot (SVO) logic.
Crown Copyright© 2010 Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Pervasive computing is the next level of computing environment with information and communication technology
anywhere, anytime for everyone [1]. Pervasive computing holds the promise of simplifying daily life by integrating mobile
devices and digital infrastructures into our physical world. With such abundant service users and service providers,
authentication becomes quite important prior to the access of services, not only because it is a basic security service to assure
service users and providers that they are interacting with the intended entities, but also because mutual authentication can
prevent information leakage, avoid service abuse, and defend against malicious attacks.
Pervasive computing applications are characterized by the following basic elements [2]: (1) ubiquitous access, (2) context
awareness, (3) intelligence, (4) natural interaction. In response to the features above, the traditional security mechanism
cannot be applied straightforwardly, because traditional security mechanism is based on a static network or closed system
with a central control. Communication parties in a pervasive computing environment are unpredictable and dynamic.
Consequently, dynamic mutual trust between service users and providers should be established. Due to the high mobility
in pervasive computing environment, communicating parties often roam into different domains. Hence, fast and secure
inter-domain authentication as well as intra-domain authentication should be highly emphasized in pervasive computing
environments.
To secure inter-domain authentication in pervasive computing environments, the first challenge is that the users and the
service providers should authenticatemutually, which secures the subsequent interactions. The two classical authentication
approaches are either based on knowledge or token. However, token and knowledge are prone to be forgotten, lost, stolen
or duplicated. Neither approach is able to represent the uniqueness of a user and impersonation attacks are possible. It is
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necessary to provide an unobtrusive and convenient mutual authenticationmechanism. The second challenge is to consider
the balance between security and the capabilities of computing, storage and communication, because devices in pervasive
computing environment are usually mobile and embedded or portable, which have limited resources.
To sum up the above arguments, the inter-domain authentication scheme for pervasive computing environment should
meet the following requirements:
(1) Entity authentication: It can prevent an intruder from impersonating a legitimate user to register to the authentication
server and vice versa.
(2) Confidentiality: Only authenticated users can access the services.
(3) Low computation, storage and communication cost: Devices in pervasive computing environment have limited
resources. Therefore, as few as possible resources should be used during inter-domain authentication.
In this paper, a fast and secure inter-domain authentication and key establishment scheme for pervasive computing
environment is proposed – namely IDAS (Inter-Domain Authentication Scheme) – which involves four entities: A, B, SA and
SB,where A and B represent communication entities, and SA and SB represent authentication servers in the domains of A and
B respectively. IDAS adopts Biometric Encryption technique [3] to authenticate a mobile user. Biometric Encryption, instead
of a certificate, frees the devices from heavy burden of certificates management. IDAS adopts signcryption technique [4]
to establish a secure and fresh session key for A and B, which achieves both the functions of digital signature and public
key encryption, while using far less resources than that required by ‘‘digital signature followed by encryption’’. The security
analysis and the comparisons with other methods show that IDAS meets the above requirements.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the related work. Section 3 presents Biometric
Encryption and Signcryption technique. IDAS is described in Section 4. We analyze the security of the protocol, verify its
correctness with the SVO logic [5], and compare it with other protocols in Section 5. A conclusion is given in Section 6.
2. Related work
According to the number of participators, the existing inter-domain authentication protocols can be divided into three
classes.
The first inter-domain authentication protocol class includes three entities: A, B and SB. Summit [6] et al. proposed an
inter-domain authentication protocol based on a proof token. A proof token binds a subject’s identity with a public key as a
digital certificate does. Additionally, a proof token also proves the fact that the subject has been successfully authenticated
in the issuer’s domain when it is issued. The protocol avoids the interaction between the current domain server and the
user’s registration domain server, and lowers the time delay of authentication. But it requires to issue a roaming certificate
between servers, which brings some cost for administrators.
The second inter-domain authentication protocol class includes four entities: A, B, SA, and SB. Ford [7] et al. proposed
an inter-domain authentication and key negotiation protocol based on identity encryption. This scheme avoids the
administration and verification process of certificates, but the whole interaction process is based on identity encryption.
Identity-based encryption cannot protect the user’s privacy well. A large amount of message exchange brings about long
time delay. Yeh and Sun [8] proposed two four-party password-based authentication and key establishment protocols,
which need public key infrastructure to distribute and verify the servers’ public keys for the clients. This is a significant
requirement for standard password-based authentication protocols in wired network applications, but less desirable for
lightweight computing environments.
The third inter-domain authentication protocol class includes five entities: A, B, SA, SB and P, where P is the father server
of SA and SB. Ren-Junn [9] et al. proposed an inter-domain authentication protocol based on symmetric encryption and
hash functions. Hung-Yu Chien [10] et al. also proposed a similar protocol, in which symmetric encryption is replaced by
public-key encryption. Both methods adopt hash functions instead of certificates. The overhead of maintaining certificates
is reduced, but certificate scrambling can easily be brought about, and the additional server increases the time delay.
All the protocols mentioned above show disadvantages either in time delay, or in computation and storage cost, which
are not suitable for pervasive computing environments. In our inter-domain authentication scheme, we adopt Biometrics
to guarantee the uniqueness and privacy of users and adopt Signcryption to generate a secure session key. IDAS can provide
an unobtrusive and convenient authentication mechanism, and protect users and authentication servers against fraud.
Biometric encryption and Signcryption techniques are introduced in the following section.
3. Biometric Encryption and signcryption
3.1. Biometric Encryption
Compared with the two classical personal authentication approaches, knowledge based approach and token based
approach, Biometrics can represent the uniqueness of a user through electronic examinations of his or her physiological
characteristics such as iris, fingerprint, or face, and/or through behavioral characteristics.
Conventional biometric identification typically consists of an enrollment stage and a verification stage. During the
enrollment stage, a user’s biometric template is gathered and stored in the authentication server. During the verification
stage, the user’s biometrics sampled on the spot are matched against the stored biometric template to verify his or her
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Fig. 1. Biometric Encryption process.
Table 1
Signcryption implementation.
Sender encrypts messagem Receiver decrypts to verify
x ∈ [1 . . . q− 1] (k1, k2) = hash((ya · g r )(s.xb)modp)
(k1, k2) = hash((ybx)mod p) m = Dk1 (c)
c = Ek1 (m) ⇒ c, r, s⇒ Only when KHk2 (m) = r ,m can be accepted.
r = KHk2 (m)
s = ( x
(r+xa) mod q)
identity. If the stored biometric template of a user is compromised, there could be severe consequences for the user because
the biometric template lacks revocation mechanisms.
With the proliferation of information exchange across the Internet and the storage of sensitive data in an open network
environment, cryptography is becoming an increasingly important feature of computer security. Regardless of whether a
user employs a symmetric or a public-key system, the security is dependent on the secrecy of the secret or private key
(passcode). Because of the large size of a cryptographically-strong key, it would clearly not be feasible to require the user
to remember and enter the key each time. It is necessary to develop a method so that the user need not remember the
passcode, and only the valid user can release the key. Bodo proposed a method in a German patent, where the data derived
from the biometrics could be used directly as a cryptographic key. However, the leakage of a cryptographic key can lead to
the disclosure of the biometrics.
In order to protect the users’ biometric templates and keys, Mytec Technologies Inc proposed Biometric Encryption
technique (BE) [3]. The Biometric Encryption solution also has a two-stage process as shown in Fig. 1: the enrollment stage
and the verification stage. During the enrollment stage, the biometrics is bound with a cryptographic key to create some
secret data as Bioscrypt. During the verification stage, the sampled biometrics on the spot are combined with the Bioscrypt
to recover the key. Bioscrypt does not reveal any information about the key or the biometric features. It is computationally
hard to decode the key without any knowledge of the user’s biometrics, and vice versa. Consequently, Bioscrypt can provide
excellent privacy protection. The key itself is completely independent of biometrics. Therefore, it can be changed or updated
when required. Even if the key is ever compromised, the biometric cannot be leaked. In conclusion, Biometric Encryption
can not only secure a cryptographic key, but also can protect a user’s biometrics, which meets the four properties described
in [11]: diversity, revocability, security and performance.
Bioscrypt can reduce the storage requirement for mobile devices and the management requirement for certificates.
Besides, it is faster to generate the Bioscrypt with face than with fingerprint or iris, which can reduce the registration time.
3.2. Signcryption
Signcryption was proposed by Yuliang Zheng [4]. Signcryption can achieve both signature and public-key encryption in a
rational logic procedure, and the cost ismuch lower than the traditional way that digital signature is followed by encryption.
Hence, it is a perfect method to transmit and preserve information with encryption and authentication.
The signcryption technique based on a discrete logarithm can be described as follows. P is a big prime number. Q is a
big prime factor of p − 1. G selected from 1 to p − 1 is an integer of factorial q. E represents encryption and D represents
decryption. KHk(m) is a hashing function of messagem using the key k. The detailed procedure is shown in Table 1.
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Fig. 2. Mutual authentication architecture.
In order to increase the security of signcryption, c , r and s are transmitted secretly and random numbers xa and xb are
used to resist replay attacks. Moreover, after finishing signcryption, both sides begin to negotiate a session key to secure the
subsequent traffic.
4. Inter-domain authentication scheme
The proposed system IDAS includes four entities: two users A and B, and two authentication servers SA and SB. A and B
are located in different domains. SA and SB are servers in the domains of A and B respectively. In IDAS, it is required that only
legal users in one domain can request to access other services in other different domains. Therefore, IDAS includes two parts:
intra-domain authentication and inter-domain authentication. Intra-domain authentication sets up mutual trust between
a user and a service provider in the same domain, and generates Bioscrypt and a secret key for inter-authentication. Inter-
authentication builds mutual trust between a user and a service provider in the different domains, such as between A and
B. In this section, we first present intra-domain authentication briefly, and then we describe inter-domain authentication in
detail.
4.1. Intra-domain authentication
The intra-domain authentication system architecture similar to that in [12] is shown in Fig. 2, consisting of three types
of entities: the mobile user (U), the service provider (SP), and the authentication server (AS). It includes three phases: the
registration phase between U and AS, the access service phase between U and SP, and the authentication phase between
SP and AS. U first registers to AS. When U wants to access some service, U sends an access request to SP. SP forwards the
request to AS in order to get some acknowledgment on U from AS. If U is illegal, the access request is rejected. During the
registration phase, Biometric Encryption algorithm is adopted to generate a certificate-like item named Bioscrypt. Bioscrypt
represents a user’s identity and can be used to perform mutual authentication with the service provider.
4.1.1. Biometric Encryption algorithm
In IDAS, the Biometric Encryption cryptosystem is shown in Fig. 3, including the key linking and retrieving phases.
In the key linking phase, the face is first processed by discrete-hashing [12] based on the iterative inner-product between
a user’s face and a tokenized random number r which can be produced from a seed in a secure device or remembered by
the user. Discrete-hashing is described as follows.
(1) Feature extraction. Fisher Discrimination Analysis (FDA) [13] is used to extract the face features represented in a vector
format,w ∈ Rn with n denoting the feature length ofw.
(2) Use r to generatem orthogonal pseudo random vectors, {r i ∈ Rn|i = 1, 2, . . .m} andm ≤ n.
(3) Compute the inner product {t i ∈ T |i = 1, 2, . . . ,m} between r andw.
(4) Compute am bit FaceHash code: bi = 0 if t i ≤ 0; bi = 1, if t i > 0.
Next, Reed–Solomon codes are designed to correct the errors (bit differences) within the reference and test FaceHash.
Then, the biometric template is protected by XOR operation as shown in Eq. (1). σ represents biocode. H(key) is stored
in the authentication server and H is the hash function.
b⊕ key = σ . (1)
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Fig. 3. The key binding cryptosystem.
At last, key and biometrics are discarded.
In the key retrieving phase, the fresh face sample is first discretized into biocode, which is represented by t .
Next, Reed–Solomon codes are used to correct the error within the reference and test FaceHash.
Then, key′ is retrieved by computing Eq. (2).
σ ⊕ t = key′. (2)
At last, if hash(key) = hash(key′), then the user is legal. The face sample is discarded again.
4.1.2. Intra-domain authentication
The primary intra-domain authentication steps are shown in Fig. 4. For ease of reference, the notations used in the
protocol description are listed in Table 2.
(1) First, when a user comes into a domain, he must submit his face biometrics to his AS before he accesses some services.
(2) AS generates a newkeyKsid for the SID requested by the user and binds the user’s biometricswith the newkey to generate
biocode as Bioscrypt. AS stores h(Ksid) and its corresponding SID. Moreover, biometrics, Bioscrypt and Ksid are discarded.
In this step, AS will distribute a different number to every user in order to match the corresponding credential. A user’s
real identity cannot be deduced by the number, which helps to protect a user’s privacy.
(3) A user sends an access request encrypted with Ksa to SP. This message includes the number generated in step (2),
Bioscrypt, SID, biometric feature vectors, and a time stamp Tu.
(4) SP simply forwards this request to AS.
(5) After receiving the request message from SP, AS first decrypts the message with its private key. Second, it verifies the
time stamp tomake sure that a replay attack has not happened. Third, AS checks whether SP is the right service provider
by comparing the SP’s SID list with the SID received.
(6) If there is a match in step (5), a key is recovered from Bioscrypt and biometric feature vectors.
(7) AS fetches the hash value of the key according to the user’s number and SID in step (2). If the stored h(key)matches the
hash value of the key in step (6), the user is authenticated successfully. Then, AS sends an encrypted acknowledgment
to SP, including a time stamp Ta, SID and h(Ksid).
(8) After receiving the acknowledgment from AS, SP checks the time stamp to judge whether it is replayed by decrypting
this message with SKsa.
At the end of themutual authentication, both the user and the SP hold a new session key h(Ksid) to secure the subsequent
traffic.
4.2. Inter-domain authentication and key establishment
In this section, we describe our inter-domain authentication and key establishment protocol. Suppose that the public key
of each entity is open to all, A is a user requesting services and B is a service provider in a different domain. A and B have
finished intra-domain authentication. Each message includes the sender’s and the receiver’s ID, and here user ID is omitted
for simplicity. The detailed interactions are shown in the Fig. 5.
(1) A sends an access request to B, which includes SID, a random number Na, and an authentication factor to SA. The
authentication factor encrypted with Ksa includes the number assigned by SA, the corresponding Bioscrypt, the face
feature vectors, and a random number Na. The whole request is encrypted with Ksb.
(2) B only appends his service list (SID-List) and his random number Nb encrypted with Ksb to the access request.
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Table 2
Notations.
Symbols Meaning
U A service user.
AS Authentication server which authenticates the user for access control.
SP Service provider.
SID A service type identifier. Different users may apply for the same service type.
KH() A keyed hash function.
E() Encryption function.
Ka, K−a 1 Public and private key pair of entity A.
SKsa Shared secret key between entities A and S.
h() A secure one-way hash function.
T Time stamp face User’s biometric feature vectors.
ack Access acknowledgment.
Fig. 4. Mutual authentication.
Fig. 5. Inter-domain authentication and key establishment.
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(3) SB decrypts the message from B. If A is one of SB’s registered users, inter-domain authentication starts. Otherwise,
SB sends an authentication request encrypted with Ksa to SA, which includes A’s authentication factor and a random
number Nsb generated by SB.
(4) SA decrypts the message from SB and looks up the corresponding h(Ksid) according to the number. If h(Ksid) matches
h′(Ksid) recovered from Bioscrypt and face feature vectors, it shows that A is legal. SA sends a message including Nsa
and Nsb encrypted with Ksb to SB.
(5) If Nsb decrypted by SB is correct, it shows that SA is legal. Then SB sends a feedback to SA, which includes Nsa encrypted
with Ksa.
(6) If Nsa is verified to be correct, it shows that SB is legal. If SA trusts SB, SA sends the authentication result of A to SB. The
whole message is encrypted with h(Ksid), which can only be decrypted by A.
(7) If Nsb is correct, SB sends a feedback to B and A. The message sending to B includes Na, SID, Nb and a new random
number Nsb2, which is encrypted with Kb. The message sending to A includes Na, SID and some message from SA to A,
which is encrypted with Ka.
(8) Based on the validity of Nb from step (7), B can authenticate SB and A. If SB and A are legal, B begins to prepare for the
key establishment. First, B selects its own secret xb and uses public parameters g and p to calculate yb = gxb mod p.
Then, B sends an acknowledgment to A encrypted with Ka, which includes yb and Nb2 produced newly.
(9) A checks the validity of SB through Na from step (7). If Na decrypted with h(Ksid) is correct, SA is legal. A selects its own
secret xa and calculates the public information ya = gxa mod p. A checks the validity of B through Na from step (8). If B
is legal, A sends a feedback to B encrypted with Kb, which includes ya and Na2,.
(10) B checks the validity of A through the correctness of Nb2. Until now, the inter-domain authentication is finished and
a session key establishment begins. B selects a new key with L length and an integer x from 1 to p − 1 randomly. B
calculates (k1, k2) = h(yxa mod p), c = Ek1(key), r = KHk2(key,Na2), s = x(r+xb) mod q, and then sends a message to A
encrypted with Ka, which includes c , r , s and Na2.
(11) A decrypts the message from (10). Then A calculates (k1, k2) = h((yb · g r)(s.xa) mod p), key = Dk1(c) and KHk2(key,Na2).
If KHk2(key,Na2) is equal to r , the key is proved to be secure. K = KHkey(Na2) is calculated as the new session key, and
Nb2 is encrypted to B with K .
(12) If Nb2 is correct, B begins to calculate K in the same way as A and gives a feedback.
(13) A verifies the correctness of Na2. Until now, the inter-domain authentication and key establishment process has
finished. The new session key K is used to secure the subsequent traffic for A and B.
5. Protocol analysis and verification
5.1. Protocol analysis
5.1.1. Mutual authentication
The main aim of mutual authentication is to verify the identity of a service user and a service provider. According to the
domains where a service user and a service provider are located, there are the following mutual authentication situations
in IDAS.
Mutual authentication between A and SA: SA recovers h′(Ksid) from the Bioscrypt and the face feature vectors of A. A
authenticates SA based on the comparison result between h(Ksid) and h′(Ksid). Only SA and A know h(Ksid), so A can decrypt
the message. As a result, SA can prove the validity of A. Mutual authentication between A and SA is achieved by messages
in steps (1), (2), (3), (6) and (7) of inter-domain authentication.
Mutual authentication between B and SB: SB authenticates B based on the SID-list of B. B authenticates SB based on the
random numbers and the public key encryption. Mutual authentication between B and SB is achieved by the messages in
steps (2) and (6) of inter-domain authentication.
Mutual authentication between A and SB: SB authenticates A according to the authentication result between SA and A. A
authenticates SB according to the authentication result between SA and SB. Both A and B authenticate each other based on
the decisions of SB and SA. Mutual authentication between A and SB is achieved by the messages in steps (1), (2), (3), (4),(5),
(6) and (7) of inter-domain authentication.
Mutual authentication between SA and SB: Authentication is achieved by the messages in steps (4), (5), and (6) based on
the public key encryption and random numbers between SA and SB, which is a typical challenge-response scheme.
5.1.2. Security analysis
Off-line guess: In off-line guess attack, attackers try to infer the privacy information from the captured messages, which
is harmful, because attackers have no limitations of time and resources for calculating, and all kinds of resources can be used
to decrypt the message at off-line state. In our scheme, all messages are encrypted with random numbers, which makes off-
line guess attack more difficult. During the phase of key establishment, it is infeasible for attackers to attempt to guess c, r
and s from message (10) of inter-domain authentication, because the message is encrypted. Furthermore, both c and r are
encrypted with a random number, which makes the message more secure.
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Table 3
Length of the parameters.
Parameter Length Annotation
Bioscrypt LB The result of biocode.
Face LF The length of face sample
Random LR The length of the random number
Hash LH The result of Hash. The length is 128bit for MD5
Public Key LP Suppose the length of all public key is the same
Table 4
Storage requirements.
Fixed storage Temporary storage
A LB+LF+2LR+3LP+LH 3LR+4LH
B 2LR+3LP+LH 3LR+4LH
SA LH+LP 2LR
SB 3LP+LH 2LR
Table 5
Computation cost.
Authentication Key establishment
PE SE DE Hash Ex PE SE DE Hash Ex
A 2 0 2 0 0 1 1 3 2 1
B 1 0 1 0 0 2 1 3 2 1
SA 2 1 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
SB 4 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Online guess: Similar to the off-line guess, there is less probability for attackers to succeed because of the security of
cryptography system, random numbers and the limited resources.
Forward stability: Even though some of the previous session keys are obtained by the attackers, the new keys cannot
be guessed out. In our protocol, the session key K is relevant to key of B which is different and random every time. Thus,
attackers cannot predict the new session key K even though they have gotten some previous session keys and the key of B.
Backward stability: Even though the attackers know the current session key K , old session keys cannot be guessed out
because there are no relevancies among these session keys.
Man-in-the-middle attack: In the worst case, suppose SA or SB is dishonest as a man-in-the-middle attacker. On the
one hand, SA or SB wants to decrypt the messages between A and B. After authentication, A and B break away from the
control of SA and SB. The session key K is established by A and B without SA’s and SB’s participation, so SA and SB can not
know the session key K and cannot decrypt the messages between A and B. On the other hand, SB or SA wants to carry
out impersonation attacks. Because SB knows nothing about Bioscrypt and other secret information shared by A and SA, SB
cannot impersonate A or SA. Similar to SB, SA cannot get any secret information shared by SB andB, so SA cannot impersonate
B or SB.
5.1.3. Performance analysis
In this section, we analyze IDAS in terms of storage, computation and communication traffic cost. The length of the
parameters used in IDAS is listed in Table 3. In IDAS, every entity has temporary and permanent parameters. A needs to store
Bioscrypt, face feature vectors, Ksa and Ksb as permanent parameters. Ka, K−a 1, and K are stored as temporary parameters.
B stores Kb, K−b 1, Ksa, Ksb and K as permanent parameters. SB and SA store their own public keys. The storage requirements
are listed in Table 4.
If hash function is MD5, the hash result will be 16 bytes. In that case, the maximum permanent parameters storage space
of A is 90 bytes plus the length of public key, and the maximum permanent parameters storage space of B is 90 bytes plus
the length of public key. The storage requirement is lightweight even for embedded or portable equipments.
The computation overhead focuses on encryption, decryption and hash operations at the stages of authentication
and key establishment. The computation cost is listed in Table 5. In Table 5, PE represents the operation times of
public key encryption. SE represents the operation times of symmetric encryption. Ex represents the operation times of
exponentiations. DE represents the operation times of decryption.
It can be seen that, during the inter-domain authentication and key establishment phases, one needs 12 instances of
public key encryption operation, 16 instances of decryption operation, 3 instances of symmetric encryption, 5 instances
of hash operation and one exponentiations operation. In IDAS, public-key encryption and decryption consumes the main
computation time and resources. With the rapid development of ASIC, the process of public-key encryption is much easier
and faster.
The analysis of communication traffic is in terms of the number of messages and the size of messages. During the
authentication phase, there are a total of eight messages in the inter-domain communication between A and B, between
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B and SB, and between A and SB. There are a total of four messages to establish a secure session key during the key
establishment phase. Another advantage of IDAS is that the messages as the output of these encryption algorithms have
a fixed size.
From the above analysis on storage, computation and communication traffic cost, we can conclude that IDAS is a
lightweight protocol which can well meet the requirements of pervasive computing environments.
5.2. Correctness proof
In this section, the correctness of IDAS is formally verified with the SVO logic [10,5]. SVO logic is based on a unification
of four of its predecessors in the BAN family of logics and is relatively simple to use. Protocol correctness means that, after
secure mutual authentication, both parties ascertain that they are sharing a fresh session key, and both are sure that the
same trust is held by the other side. In particular, in IDAS, after the execution of the key establishment protocol, both A and
B obtain a new session key K. Therefore, the verification goals are as follows.
A |≡ A K+
←→
B B |≡ B K+
←→
A.
Firstly, we should formalize the messages transmitted between the two entities. Secondly, the premises sets are built,
which include the initial trust of the two entities, the interaction messages and so on. The formalized message interaction
sequences and premises sets are shown as follows. The marks and symbols can be referred to the definitions of SVO.
Formalized Message Sequence
M1. B→ A : {[Na]k−b 1,Nb2, yb}Ka
M2. A→ B : {Nb2,Na2, ya}kb
M3. B→ A : {c, r, s,Na2}Ka
M4. A→ B : {Nb2}K
M5. B→ A : {Na2}K
Premises Sets
P1. A |≡ #(Na); A |≡ #(Na2)
P2. B |≡ #(Nb); B |≡ #(Nb2)
P3. A |≡ PKδ(A,Na2)
P4. B |≡ PKσ (B, key)
P5. A |≡|⇒ A key
←→
B
P6. A |≡ (A ∝ {[Na]k−1b ,Nb2, yb} ⊃ A |≡ {[Na]k−1b ,Nb2, PKδ(B, yb,#(yb))})
P7. A |≡ (A ∝ {c, r, s,Na2}Ka ⊃ A |≡ {c, r, s,#(Na2), PKδ(B, key),#(key)}Ka)
P8. A |≡ (A ⊃ {Na2}K ⊃ A |≡ {#(Na2)}K )
P9. B |≡ (B ∝ {Nb2,Na2, ya}kb ⊃ B |≡ {#(Nb2),Na2, PKδ(A, ya), PKδ(A,Na2)}kb)
P10. B |≡ (B ∝ {Nb2} ⊃ B |≡ {#(Nb2)}K ).
Assume that both A and B believe their servers’ jurisdiction of the legitimacy. Both entities believe their own random
numbers and the key parameters generated in IDAS are secure. It also assume that each principal believes the freshness of
the random numbers. Other premises are made according to the expressions of the SVO logic.
The first two assumptions P1 and P2 state that both A and B trust the freshness of their random numbers. P3 and P4 state
that each principal believes their own agreement key is secure and each principal controls the generation of the agreement
key. P6, P7 and P8 showwhat A’s comprehension about the session key, while P9 and P10 show B’s complementation about
the session key.
After themessages are formalized and the premises sets are built, the verification procedure from A’s standpoint is listed
as follows. The procedure from B’s is similar to that of A. R7 and R8 show that IDAS has reached the anticipated aims.
Verification Procedure
R1. A |≡ B |≈ {c, r, s,#(Na2), PKδ(B, key),#(key)},by M3, P7, P5, P1, Ax3, MP, Nec
R2. A |≡ PKσ (B, key), by R1, Ax15, Ax16, Nec
R3. A |≡ A K←→ B, by R2, P3, Ax5, Nec
R4. A |≡ A K−
←→
B, by R3, the fact that A produces K
R5. A |≡ B |∼ {#(Na2) ∧ B C K}, by R5, P1, Ax19, Nec
R6. A |≡ (B |≈ {B C K}), by R5, P1, Ax19, Nec
R7. A |≡ A K+
←→
B, by R4, R6, Nec
R8. A |≡ #(K), by the fact that A produces K.
L. Yao et al. / Computers and Mathematics with Applications 60 (2010) 234–244 243
Table 6
Comparison.
Items Protocols
Entity Message M with RS Privacy Computation Storage Assumption
Summit’s protocol 3 10 0 N PE Proof token and
roaming-certificate
Pre-established trust between
domains
ID-4-PAKE 4 12 6 N PE and SE Initial passwords No special requests
Ren-Junn’s
protocol
5 10 4 Y SE and hash Certs and symmetric keys Symmetric keys between the
entity and its server
Our protocol 4 12 4 Y PE and SE Bioscrypt No special requests
5.3. Comparisons
In this section, IDAS is comparedwith some other schemes in terms of security, privacy and performance. The comparison
results are shown in Table 6. In Table 6, the column ‘Entity’ represents the numbers of entities that participate in the
protocol, and the ‘Message (M)’ column shows the total numbers of messages that are transmitted during the protocol. The
column ‘M with RS’ shows how many times the entities should communicate with their register servers (RS). The column
‘Privacy’ showswhether the protocol protects the user’s privacy or not. While the ‘Computation’ column compares themain
computing operations, the ‘Storage’ column shows the storage requirements for the entities. The last column presents the
assumption conditions of each protocol. In Table 6, PE represents public key encryption, SE represents symmetric encryption,
BE represents Biometric Encryption, and Cert represents certificate.
In Table 6, though there are only three entities involved in Summit’s protocol and no interactionswith the register server,
the users need to maintain a large amount of proof tokens and the servers need to maintain a large amount of roaming-
certificates. All these operations bring great storage burdens to pervasive computing devices.What ismore, Summit assumes
that the servers have already built a trusting relationship. ID-4-PAKE protocol is based on identity encryption; the user’s
privacy cannot be protected well. Moreover, large amount of messages interacting with the register server results in long
time delays. Due to adopting an extra server, Ren-Junn’s protocol becomes simple. However, more servers mean more time
delay and more resource requirements for the environment. In addition, the hash chain used in Ren-Junn’s protocol may
bring about the problem of wrong sequences. In that case, the certificates are not coming in order and will require extra
processes and resources. IDAS replaces a certificate with Bioscrypt, generated by Biometric Encryption. Bioscrypt instead of
the certificate can not only reduce the computation and storage cost, but also protect the user’s privacy well. IDAS has no
special assumption conditions. Besides, IDAS reduces the interactions between users and their register servers, and has no
special requirements for the environment.
6. Conclusion and future work
In this paper, we present an inter-domain authentication and key establishment scheme (IDAS) for pervasive computing
environments. In IDAS, Biometrics and Signcryption techniques are adopted to protect users’ privacy and protect users and
authentication servers against fraud. Bioscrypt can reduce the storage requirement for mobile devices and the complexity
of certificates. The correctness of IDAS is provedwith SVO logic. Compared with other schemes, IDAS is superior with higher
security, higher performance and more privacy. The primary contributions of this paper are summarized as follows:
• A new mutual authentication and key establishment scheme for pervasive computing environment is presented.
• Biometric Encryption is applied to protect users’ privacy during mutual intra-domain authentication and inter-domain
authentication.
• Signcryption technique is applied to establish secure session keys, which can secure the subsequent traffic.
• SVO logic is used to verify the correctness of IDAS.
As part of our future work, we intend to do more research on Biometric Encryption algorithms to decrease the false
acceptance rate to zero. Then we would like to extend our scheme to the mobile wireless network environment, where
location-based services are one of the most desirable classes of services to be provided for mobile users. A user’s identity
can be verified based on his face biometrics captured by a high speed camera.Wewill also evaluate IDAS by simulations and
testbed experiments based on the vehicles that will incorporate intersection behavior. It is also valuable to provide fault-
tolerant features for IDAS in order to prevent someof the communicationmessages frombeing lost during the authentication
phase.
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